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Abstract
Many studies on the consequences of income inequality ﬁ  nd that where inequality is high, trust is low. There 
are, however, reasons to examine the relation between inequality and trust more closely. First, previous research 
does not differentiate between the effect of income inequality and that of national wealth. Furthermore, the under-
lying mechanism is often unclear. Finally, the association might be dependent on non-Western countries where in-
come inequality is extremely high. In this paper, we evaluate whether there is a relation between income inequality 
and trust in a sample of Western developed economies when taking into account national wealth. Theoretically, we 
distinguish between stratiﬁ  cation effects and perception effects of inequality. Empirically, besides actual income 
inequality and national wealth, we include a measurement of perceived inequality on the basis of individual level 
earnings estimations for stereotypical jobs. We ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant effect of inequality on trust when taking into 
account national wealth, suggesting that in Western countries the amount of resources rather than its distribution 
explains trust.
Key words: trust, income inequality, perceived inequality, national wealth, comparative research.Page • 8
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1.  Introduction
Income inequality has been linked to many undesirable outcomes in societies. It has, for example, been argued 
that higher income inequality leads to higher levels of drug use, obesity, poorer educational performance, violence 
and lower mental health. (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Huisman and Oldehinkel, 2009; Kawachi, et al., 1997; 
Neckerman and Torch 2007). Many of the studies that examine negative effects of income inequality presume that 
the effects of income inequality are mediated by a decrease in social trust (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). A nega-
tive effect of income inequality on social trust would therefore result in several undesirable outcomes. The central 
argument why inequality reduces trust is that as differences between people are larger, uncertainty increases and 
trust in other people subsequently goes down. In this paper, we discuss three potential problems with the current 
state of this hypothesis. In our analyses, we examine the consequences of dealing with these problems. 
Recently, a number of studies have examined the relation between income inequality and generalized trust. 
Most of these studies found that -at least on the national level- where income inequality is high, generalized trust 
is low (Leigh 2006; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Jordahl 2007; Gustavsson and Jordahl2006; Uslaner and Brown 
2005). Other studies show that generalized trust is not only dependent on the (national) level of income inequality, 
but also on individual factors, for example (and most notably) the degree to which someone is optimistic about 
their life chances (Uslaner 2002) and the degree to which someone is economically successful (Delhey and New-
ton 2003; Dohmen, Verbakel, and Kraaykamp 2010).
There are, however, reasons to further develop the hypothesis that income inequality affects trust negatively. 
First, previous studies do not sufﬁ  ciently distinguish between effects of income inequality and effects of general 
wealth of a country. Modernization theory predicts that having more resources leads to higher trust (Delhey and 
Newton, 2005). Delhey and Newton (2005) ﬁ  nd indeed that national wealth is a predictor of trust. However, most 
studies that examine the relation between inequality and trust either do not account for general wealth  (e.g. Jordahl 
2007) or use it as an instrumental variable, rather than a variable of substantive interest (Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005, Uslaner and Brown, 2005) 
A second problem with previous studies on the inequality-trust hypothesis is that, although the empirical 
results point to a negative association, the underlying mechanism is often unclear. Uslaner and Brown (2005) 
argue that when inequality is high, people at the top and the bottom of the income distribution will not perceive 
each other as facing a shared fate. Therefore, they will have less reason to trust people of different backgrounds. 
Furthermore, Uslaner and Brown (2005: 869) contend that “where inequality is high, people will be less likely to Page • 10
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believe that the future looks bright, and they will have even fewer reasons to believe that they are the masters of 
their own fate”. In this example, inequality is expected to affect trust through perceptions of inequality. 
On the other hand, societies that are highly stratiﬁ  ed are more closed; it is therefore less likely that people 
from different strata meet each other, resulting in less trust. In this case, the actual distribution of resources, rather 
then how people perceive this distribution is expected to negatively affect trust. We label this stratiﬁ  cation effects. 
A number of recent studies have argued that increasing income inequalities in Western societies increase social 
boundaries (Elgar and Aitken 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). 
Hence, there seem to be two different mechanisms through which income inequality affects social trust: one 
that assumes trust to vary depending on the distribution of resources, and one that is rooted in the perception of in-
equality. We argue that research on the relation between income inequality and social trust beneﬁ  ts from a theoreti-
cal framework that actively differentiates between two mechanisms we label stratiﬁ  cation effects and perception 
effects. We examine both mechanisms empirically. 
The third improvement to the inequality-trust hypothesis is related to the sample of countries that are included 
in the empirical analysis. In some studies (e.g. Rohstein and Uslaner 2005), the negative effect of inequality seems 
to depend on a group of non-Western countries with high levels of inequality. It could be that unobserved cultural, 
political or social differences between non-Western and Western countries explain part of the difference in trust.   
If, for some reason, differences in inequality do not matter among relatively low inequality countries, the theory 
needs to account for this threshold effect. 
We therefore test the inequality-trust hypothesis using two data sets containing Western industrialized coun-
tries. In doing so, we try to overcome the aforementioned three problems in the current literature. Firstly, we con-
trol for national wealth. Second, we differentiate between different mechanisms through which income inequality 
might affect social trust. Finally, we look at a culturally more homogenous sample of countries that nonetheless 
provides substantive variation in trust, as well as in inequality. 
Our empirical contribution further lies in the measurement and analysis of both stratiﬁ  cation and perception 
effects. Current research focuses on the income distribution in the form of a Gini-coefﬁ  cient to measure inequal-
ity. As such, stratiﬁ  cation and perception mechanisms are measured in one variable. Osberg and Smeeding (2006) 
have developed a measure of perceived inequality, but do not relate it to trust. To better account for both mecha-
nisms, we include the measure of perceived inequality as proposed by Osberg and Smeeding (2006), as well as 
actual income inequality, to explain trust.Page • 11
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2.  The inequality-trust hypothesis
Current research on the relation between income inequality and generalized social trust shows a widely shared 
theoretical prediction about the effect of income inequality on social trust: when income inequality rises, trust goes 
down (see for example (Leigh 2006; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Putnam 2007; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Jordahl 
2007; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2006; Delhey and Newton 2005). Although there is consensus on the direction of 
the effect, the underlying mechanism is contested. In this section, we discuss three ways in which the theoretical 
mechanism about income inequality and social trust can be improved. 
First, the inequality-trust hypothesis could beneﬁ  t from distinguishing the consequences of the distribution 
of resources and consequences of the amount of resources that are available. Studies that focus on the relation 
between the amount of resources available and trust ﬁ  nd that the availability of resources is closely related to gen-
eral trust. For example, Ross et al. (2001) conclude that in neighbourhoods where resources are scarce, mistrust 
develops. Also on the national level, wealth is a predictor of trust. Delhey and Newton (2005: 312) explain this as 
follows: “Risk and trust are closely associated, and it has also been argued that the wealthier the society, and the 
more it meets basic material needs, the more its members are able to take risks by virtue of their trusting attitudes, 
while, at the same time, making it both less necessary and less rewarding to act in an untrustworthy manner”. In 
other words, people in richer countries experience less risks and are therefore more likely to trust others. 
Many previous studies that examine the relationship between income inequality and trust do not account for 
national wealth (e.g. Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Jordahl 2007; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Dohmen, et al., 2010). 
Delhey and Newton (2005) include income inequality and national wealth, but not simultaneously in one model. 
Since poorer countries tend to have higher income inequality, not accounting for national income might bias the 
relation between inequality and trust. 
There are, however, some studies that do include national wealth and income inequality simultaneously. Elgar 
and Airken (2010; see also Elgar 2010) include both per capita income and income inequality, and ﬁ  nd that wealth 
predicts trust positively, inequality negatively. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) examine the effect of heterogeneity 
on trust in the United States. Their unit of analysis is the metropolitan sampling area. They ﬁ  nd a positive effect 
of community level income in trust when including the Gini-coefﬁ  cient. In their ﬁ  nal model, however, the Gini-Page • 12
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coefﬁ  cient is no longer signiﬁ  cant (and income is). These ﬁ  ndings stress the importance of controlling for the 
amount of available resources when we examine the consequences of the distribution of resources. 
A second improvement to the inequality-trust hypothesis can be made by actively distinguishing between the 
effects of actual income inequality and the effects of perception of income inequality. “Between a condition of 
objective inequality and the response of a disadvantaged person,” Robert Dahl (1971, p. 95) has written, “lie the 
perceptions, evalua- tions, expectations—in short, the psyche—of the individual.” Individual perceptions of in-
equalities do not necessarily follow the pattern of actual inequalities (Osberg and Smeeding 2006). People do not 
know the entire income distribution. As a consequence, people evaluate this distribution based on the (imperfect) 
information that they have. Such information can come from various sources, be it the comparison of people’s 
own living standards with others, media reports, politicians, or any other outlook into the distribution that they 
have. Therefore, perceived income levels and consequently perceived inequality measures, are likely to differ from 
actual income inequality. Perception effects of inequality thus occur due to individuals’ perception of the income 
distribution. An example of a perception effect would be if a relatively poor individual in a highly unequal society 
believes that the economic distribution is based on unfair grounds and therefore mistrusts the rich, resulting in 
overall lower levels of trust. 
People’s perception of inequality can affect a number of conditions that are associated with social trust. A 
higher perceived inequality may lead people to identify less with people of other incomes, or create the idea that 
the income distribution or society as such is unfair. Furthermore, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) suggest that ine-
quality can lead to envy and jealousy of the less privileged. The perception of inequality can affect optimism about 
one’s own chances to improve in society, which multiple studies (e.g. Delhey and Newton, 2001, Rothstein and 
Uslaner 2005) have shown to be of importance for trust. Finally, an increase in perceived income inequality might 
affect egalitarian values, which are closely connected to social trust (Uslaner, 2002, Gustavsson and Jordahl 2006).
The mechanism of stratiﬁ  cation effects of inequality is that in more unequal societies, the distribution of 
resources becomes a more important explanation for social trust. An example of a stratiﬁ  cation effect is that of a 
society where the rich and the poor live in different neighbourhoods, rarely meet each other and therefore have 
low trust in each other. Stratiﬁ  cation effects hence imply larger distances between social groups, making contact 
less likely. For example, people with higher incomes live in different neighbourhoods (Letki 2008) and let their 
children go to different schools. Less social contact between rich and poor makes people trust other people from 
different income groups less and results in lower levels of generalized trust. Alesina and Ferrara (2000, 2002) ar-
gue that economically more homogeneous communities have a higher level of social interactions leading to more Page • 13
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social capital and trust. They ﬁ  nd indeed that, for the US, in communities where inequality is higher, participation 
is lower. 
However, stratiﬁ  cation effects are not limited to social contacts only. In more unequal societies, resources 
might also be more important because they are objectively an important factor in achieving a number of societal 
advances. For example, resources can be of importance in getting a job or feeling successful which have been 
found to inﬂ  uence social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Stratiﬁ  cation effects can also occur through more 
spurious mechanisms. For example, imagine a society where high incomes are associated with higher political 
inﬂ  uence. If income inequality in this society increases, political efﬁ  cacy also increases. Political efﬁ  cacy is widely 
assumed to have an endogenous relation with social trust (e.g. Newton 2007), so an increase in income inequal-
ity can -through an increase of inequality in political efﬁ  cacy- ultimately result in inequality in generalized trust. 
According to stratiﬁ  cation effects, an increase in income inequality is accompanied with an increase of the 
importance of income as a social stratiﬁ  er. According to the ‘neo-material’ theory, (Lynch et al. 2000), resources 
are needed to achieve desirable outcomes. In the words of Lynch et al. (2000): “Under a neo-material interpreta-
tion, the effect of income inequality […] reﬂ  ects a combination of negative exposures and lack of resources held 
by individuals, along with systematic underinvestment across a wide range of human, physical, health, and social 
infrastructure”. In this view, the effect of inequality on trust occurs because of a disparity in the availability of 
resources.
In summary, the inequality-trust hypothesis needs to be formulated in such a way that it is clear whether in-
equality is predicted to affect trust via stratiﬁ  cation effects or effects of perceived inequality. Perceived inequality 
effects imply that an increase in income inequality results in an increase of people’s perception of the degree of 
income inequality, which subsequently has a depressing effect on trust. In contrast to the stratiﬁ  cation hypothesis, 
it is not the actual distribution of resources that affects trust, but the extent to which the distribution is perceived 
to be skewed. 
A third problem with the inequality-trust hypothesis is that the association might be dependent on inﬂ  uential 
outliers that are substantively different. For example, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) present a scatter plot of their 
sample (replicated in ﬁ  gure 1). The negative association between inequality and trust seems to be particularly 
driven by a few countries where the Gini-coefﬁ  cient is higher than 0.40. Furthermore, there seem to be two distinct 
groups of countries, suggesting that these countries might represent different populations.Page • 14
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Figure 1) Bivariate analysis of income inequality and trust (replication of Uslaner and Rohstein, 2005)
Figure 2) Bivariate analysis of inequality and trust for countries with high and low income inequality (sample as in Figure 
1) 
There are two reasons why this is problematic for the argument that income inequality has a negative effect on 
social trust. Firstly, it could be that more unequal countries are essentially different from the rest of the countries 
in the sample. For example, all Latin American countries are clustered on the right hand side of the graph. One 
could think of other reasons besides income inequality that might explain low trust in Latin America. Culturally, 
for example, Latin American countries are substantively different from the rest of the sample (Oyserman and Lee Page • 15
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2008). The Latin American countries are also among the poorest in the sample. The correlation between income 
inequality and national wealth (measured in GDP per capita PPP) in the sample is relatively high at 0.49 (p<0.01). 
Secondly, inequality might have an effect after surpassing a certain threshold, rather than linearly decreasing 
trust. In ﬁ  gure 2, we ﬁ  t a separate line for countries below and above a Gini-coefﬁ  cient of 0.40. Even though there 
is substantial variation in trust and inequality among the more equal countries, the differences in inequality do 
not seem to explain the variation in trust. In highly unequal countries, however, we do ﬁ  nd a negative association 
between income inequality and trust. While this approach obviously tortures the data, it does illustrate that among 
the relatively equal countries, income inequality does not seem to be an important predictor of trust. 
Even in the case that one does not believe that there are omitted variables that explain low trust levels in the 
more unequal countries, the absence of an effect of inequality among 30 countries with relatively low inequality 
warrants a further examination of the inequality-trust hypothesis. If income inequality has a negative effect on 
social trust, one would also expect to see a negative relation in a sample of Western countries. It is hence the ques-
tion whether every level of income inequality is negatively associated with trust, or whether income inequality 
is only relevant for social trust once passing a threshold. The former means that inequality has a linear effect on 
trust, while the latter implies that only after breaching a threshold, inequality is relevant for general trust. In our 
analyses, we test whether there is an effect in a sample of culturally relatively homogenous countries; Western 
industrialized societies.Page • 16
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3.  Data and Measurement
3.1.  Sample
We test the inequality-trust hypothesis drawing on two datasets. First, we make use of the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) and estimate multi-level models that contain measures of actual income inequality, per-
ceived income inequality and general wealth. These data provide a good test for the inequality-trust hypothesis, 
because the ISSP allows us to distinguish between effects of perceived and actual income inequality. The effect 
of income inequality might be dependent on countries where income inequality is extremely high, or on a sample 
containing countries that are not culturally homogeneous. To enable a test of the inequality-trust hypothesis in a 
homogenous sample, we exclude non-Western countries from the analysis. After harmonizing and cleaning the 
data and keeping only the respondents with all necessary information, our ﬁ  nal sample consists of 18,119 individu-
als, nested in 20 countries.  
Even though we tried to create a homogenous sample of countries out of the ISSP, one can still argue that it is 
not culturally homogenous enough. We therefore also estimate models using data from the European Social Sur-
vey 2002 (the 2002 wave is closest in time to the ISSP survey). In the ESS, trust is measured on a 10-point scale, 
allowing for an examination of differences in levels of trust due to income inequality, or wealth in a country.  As 
only European countries are included, this survey provides a more homogenous sample but nonetheless contains 
substantial variation in both trust and income inequality. Country-average scores on the trust-measure range from 
3,64 to 6,99. Furthermore, a null-model shows that 13,7% of the variation in trust-scores resides at the country-
level. If the inequality-trust hypothesis holds, inequality explains part of this country-based variation. After harmo-
nizing and cleaning the data and keeping only the respondents with all necessary information, this sample consists 
of 38.871 respondents from 21 countries1. Unfortunately, we cannot include perceptions of inequality, since the 
overlap with the countries that are also included in the ISSP is too small.
Ideally, one would model the relation between trust and both actual and perceived inequality cross-nationally 
over several time points. There is, however, to our knowledge, no longitudinal measure of perceived inequality 
available. We therefore examine the association cross-nationally at one point in time. This cross-national perspec-
1  We opted to leave Israel out, as it is not a European country. However, including Israel does not change the results. Furthermore, we 
imputed some values to allow us to include as many European countries as possible. The income inequality score of Swiss is not available 
in Eurostat, so we predicted it on the basis of a regression of Eurostat inequality measures on an inequality measure from the CIA World 
Factbook (2011). Finally, education levels are unavailable in Austria, so they are predicted on the basis of years of education. Leaving 
out (pair wise or simultaneously) these countries with imputed values does not change the direction or signiﬁ  cance of any of our results.Page • 18
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tive necessitates us to be cautious about making claims about causality. Therefore, we interpret our empirical 
models primarily as associations.2  
3.2.  ISSP
Dependent variable. In the ISSP, generalized trust is measured by the standard survey item “Generally speak-
ing, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”, with the 
following answer categories: “you almost always can’t be too careful in dealing with people” (15%),  “you usually 
can’t be too careful”(39%), “people usually can be trusted”(41%), “people almost always can be trusted (5%)”. 
Since the variable primarily differentiates between having and not having trust, we recoded it into a dichotomous 
variable with the value one representing ‘people usually/almost always can be trusted’ and value zero indicating 
‘you almost always/ usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people”3. Although there is much literature on 
(sub-) dimensions of trust, this item is a standard measure to measure generalized trust. Furthermore, as Nannestad   
(2008) notes in a review on social trust, the measure correlates signiﬁ  cantly on an national level with outcomes 
that are expected to be related to social trust, such as wallet-return (Bjørnskov 2006) corruption (Uslaner 2002) and 
violent crime (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2002). 
Independent variables. Actual income inequality is measured with the Gini-coefﬁ  cient in 1998, provided by 
Galbraight and Kum (2005). This is the same inequality measure that is used by Uslaner and Brown (2005). Per-
ceived inequality is measured with a set of items from the ISSP 1999. In this questionnaire, people were asked to 
estimate the actual incomes of nine relatively normal and cross-nationally comparable occupations (skilled factory 
worker, doctor in general practice, chairman of a large corporation, a lawyer, a shop assistant the owner-manager 
of a large factory, a judge in the countries highest court and a cabinet minister in the national government). Fol-
lowing Osberg and Smeeding (2006), we use the answers of these questions to construct a Gini-coefﬁ  cient of 
perceived inequality. We use the Gini-coefﬁ  cient formula provided by Brown (1994) to calculate a Gini-coefﬁ  cient 
of perceived income inequality for each individual (equation 1).
1
) )( ( 1 1 1
  
       ¦
n k
Y Y X X Gini k k k k
                                              1)
2  With the limited amount of countries (12) that were available we did examine changes in inequality perception between 1992 and 1999. 
In ﬁ  ve out of 12 countries, the perception of inequality has decreased, where it has increased in the other 7 countries. Due to the unavail-
ability of a trust-measure around 1992, we are unable to assess if the changes in inequality perception have gone hand in hand with the 
changes in social trust.
3  Alternatively, to account for the ordering of the answering categories one could estimate an ordered logit model. However, the pro-
portional odds assumption is violated, most likely to the skewed distribution of the answering categories. Given the clear cut-off point 
between having and not having trust, we prefer a logit model to an ordered logit or a linear model.Page • 19
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In this formula, G Xk refers to the n-1 cumulative proportion of the population and Yk to the n-1 cumulative 
proportion of income belonging to that cumulative proportion of the population. While these nine occupations are 
relatively comparable between the nations in our sample, they do not reﬂ  ect the entire workforce in each country. 
This restriction is, however, not expected to lead to systematic bias (see, for a more detailed discussion on the 
measure Osberg and Smeeding 2006).4
We matched the individual perceptions to the ISSP 1998 wave. We realize that the proposed mechanism of per-
ception effects presumes the perception of income inequality to precede social trust in time. However, we expect 
the perception of income inequality to be relatively robust and not to change much over the course of one year. 
Moreover, the variation that one analyses in cross-sectional analysis is across-countries.
The variation in the perception of income inequality within countries is relatively low. Therefore, following 
Osberg and Smeeding (2006), we aggregate the individual perceptions of income inequality on the national level. 
The advantage is that the perception measure is a simple country mean that serves as a contextual variable, like the 
actual Gini-coefﬁ  cient. We label the variable perceived inequality. General wealth is measured by GDP per capita 
(purchasing power parity), as provided by the World Fact Book (CIA, 2011). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for the entire sample of both the dependent and independent variables.
 Control variables. On the individual level, we include age, age squared, dummies for educational attainment, 
years of education, a dummy for not being in the labour force, a dummy for unemployment, marital status and 
religiosity.  Because individual income data is missing for large parts in both the ISSP and the ESS, we present 
models without controlling for it. However, we estimated models that do control for income and the results are 
identical to the results presented in this article. 
4  We only include people that estimated earnings for at least seven out of nine occupations. For the individuals that respectively had one 
or two missing values respectively, we used an adjusted formula, as to reﬂ  ect the restraint that the proportion of the population is equal 
for each occupation. We were unable to ﬁ  nd any systemic bias in missing values on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Furthermore, 
we replicated our models with a restriction of only including perceptions of people who listed all nine occupations and the results were 
almost identical.Page • 20
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Table 1) Descriptive statistics of (in)dependent variables for the ISSP-sample





GDP PER CAPITA 
(IN 1000$)
FRACTION OF PEOPLE 
TRUSTING
AUSTRALIA AUS 0,3822 0,39 22 0,64
GERMANY GER 0,3474 0,38 26,1 0,42
GREAT BRITTAIN GBR 0,3586 0,46 24,9 0,5
UNITED STATES USA 0,3821 0,46 33 0,53
AUSTRIA AUS 0,3592 0,43 26,6 0,52
HUNGARY HUN 0,3976 0,47 4,7 0,35
NORWAY NOR 0,3355 0,3 35,4 0,81
SWEDEN SWE 0,2869 0,34 28,6 0,7
SLOVENIA SLO 0,3461 0,44 10,9 0,17
POLAND POL 0,3776 0,53 4,3 0,23
BULGARIA BUL 0,4102 0,39 1,6 0,24
NEW ZEALAND NWZ 0,3894 0,39 15,1 0,57
CANADA CAN 0,3717 0,42 21,4 0,58
ISRAEL ISL 0,422 0,45 17 0,29
JAPAN JAP 0,4171 0,47 34,3 0,33
LATVIA LTV 0,4035 0,54 3 0,21
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SKR 0,367 0,29 3,8 0,16
FRANCE FRA 0,3625 0,48 24,8 0,22
CYPRUS CYP 0,397 0,37 14 0,16
PORTUGAL POR 0,3955 0,42 12 0,2
Source: ISSP 1998 and 1999.
3.3.  European Social Survey
Dependent variable.  In the ESS, social trust is measured by the following question “Using this card, generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 
Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be 
trusted.” Compared to the ISSP-question, this variable gives respondents a broader scale to place themselves on. 
Therefore, we can interpret this variable more as measuring levels of trust, rather than measuring whether people 
trust others or not.
Independent variables. Actual income inequality is measured by the Gini-coefﬁ  cient in 2002, derived from 
Eurostat (2011). National wealth is measured by GDP per capita, derived from the World Fact Book (CIA, 2011). 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample on the dependent and independent variables.  Page • 21
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Control variables. On the individual level, we mimic the controls from the ISSP-models as much as possible, 
by including age, age squared, a dummy for being on the labour force, a dummy for unemployment, dummies for 
educational attainment and religiosity. 
3.4.  Empirical strategy
In order to examine the effect of perceived inequality and actual income inequality, we present a series of mul-
tilevel logistic models based on the ISSP data. Subsequently, we present a series of multilevel linear models based 
on the ESS data. These models provide for an even more harmonious sample of countries. All models include the 
aforementioned control variables, but we only present the variables that are relevant for our hypothesis. 
Table 2) Descriptive statistics for (in)dependent variables for the ESS-sample
COUNTRY ACTUAL INCOME INEQUALITY*N ATIONAL WEALTH ** GENERAL TRUST (1-10) ***
AUSTRIA 24 25,7 5,07
BELGIUM 28 24,4 4,86
CZECH REPUBLIC 25 7,4 4,28
DENMARK 22 32,4 7,01
FINLAND 26 25,5 6,47
GERMANY 25 24,5 4,62
GREAT BRITTAIN 35 26,5 5,05
GREECE 33 12,3 3,64
HUNGARY 24 6,6 4,05
IRELAND 29 31,2 5,46
ITALY 29 21,3 4,55
LUXEMBOURG 27 51 5,24
NETHERLANDS 27 27,1 5,71
NORWAY 26,6 41,9 6,60
POLAND 30 5,2 3,72
PORTUGAL 37 12,3 3,99
SLOVENIA 22 11,2 3,98
SPAIN 31 16,6 4,87
SWEDEN 23 27,3 6,09
*Gini-coefﬁ  cient in 2002, from Eurostat (2011) 
** GDP per capita, in 1000$ from CIA (2011)
*** Country average for the analytical sample, from European Social SurveyPage • 22
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4.  Results
First, we look at the models for the ISSP-data. In order to examine the overlap in perceived inequality with 
actual inequality, we inspect its association. Figure 3 shows a scatter plot (with an added linear ﬁ  t) of actual in-
come inequality and perceived income inequality. The correlation of .442, (p=0.06) corresponds to roughly 20% 
shared variance of these two variables. While the association is positive and in the theoretically expected direction, 
it leaves a lot of unexplained variation. Furthermore, apart from a group of countries that lies relatively close to 
the linear ﬁ  t, we ﬁ  nd a few outliers in Norway, Slovak Republic, where the perceived income inequality is lower 
than expected on the basis of the actual income inequality and in Poland and Latvia, where the perceived income 
inequality is higher than expected. We therefore conclude that, although actual income inequality and perceived 
income inequality correlate, they cannot be seen as empirically identical. This indicates that, besides theoretically, 
people’s perception of income inequality is empirically different from actual income inequality.      
There is reason to be careful in the interpretation of this low correlation. First of all, it is based on a small 
number of countries (20).   Furthermore, while our measure of actual income inequality is based on the entire la-
bour force, our measure of perceived inequality is based on nine occupations only. We opt, however, to not only 
attribute the low correlation to the imperfect nature of the measures. Our interpretation is grounded on both our 
theoretical argument as well as on previous works with the measure of perceived inequality (most notably, Osberg 
and Smeeding, 2006).
Figure 3) Perceived income inequality versus actual income inequalityPage • 24
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Graphs 4a-c show a preliminary insight in the association between inequality, wealth and trust. The percentage 
of people trusting in a country (Y-axis) is plotted against actual income inequality, perceived income inequality 
and national wealth (X-axis). Actual income inequality correlates signiﬁ  cantly negative with trust  (-.50; p=0.03), 
indicating that people in more unequal countries are less likely to trust others. The correlation for perceived in-
equality is smaller  (-.37), indicating that countries in which people perceive more inequality are less trusting, 
but the coefﬁ  cient is not signiﬁ  cant at the ﬁ  ve percent level (p= .10). General wealth correlates rather strong with 
trust (.67; p<.01) indicating that people in richer countries are more likely to have general trust. This is, however, 
a bivariate picture only. To further analyse the relationship between inequality and trust, we estimate a number of 
multivariate multilevel models.
Figures 4a, 4b and 4c) Fraction of people trusting versus actual income inequality, perceived income inequality and 
national wealthPage • 25
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Table 3)  Multilevel logistic regression predicting the likelihood of trusting (ISSP)
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
                          BB B B BB
(SE)( SE)( SE)( SE)( SE)( SE)
ACTUAL INCOME INEQUALITY          -14.467** -12.451* -8.296 -6.544
(5.492) (6.034) (4.894) (5.254)
PERCEIVED INCOME INEQUALITY                     -4.823 -2.188 3.137 -1.957
(2.860) (2.894) (2.242) (2.359)
GENERAL WEALTH                .045** .050*** .044**
(.014) (.013) (.014)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES XX X X XX
LOG-LIKELIHOOD            -10 431 -10 433 -10 431 -10 427 -10 428 -10 427
RHO                             .150          .172          .146          .105          .109          .101   
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 20 20 20 20 20 20
NUMBER OF  INDIVIDUALS            18 119 18 119 18 119 18 119 18 119 18 119
Source: ISSP 1998 and 1999
Table 3 presents the estimates based on the ISSP data. The ﬁ  rst two models estimate the effect of actual income 
inequality and perceived income inequality, without controlling for national wealth. In model 1, the coefﬁ  cient of 
inequality is negative and signiﬁ  cant, indicating that, ceteris paribus, people in more unequal countries are less 
likely to have social trust. Model 2 shows a negative association between degrees of perceived inequality and the 
likelihood of trusting, but the effect is not signiﬁ  cant. There is therefore no indication in the multi-variate models 
that people in countries where more inequality is perceived are more likely to trust others. 
Model 3 simultaneously includes actual and perceived inequality. In this model, only the effect of actual in-
come inequality is statistically signiﬁ  cant. This is preliminary evidence that actual, rather than perceived income 
inequality seems to be associated with general trust in Western countries. Up until model 3, the ﬁ  ndings are in line 
with the inequality-trust hypothesis. As one of the problems with the inequality-trust hypothesis is that the effect 
of income inequality might be spurious because general wealth is not controlled for, we are primarily interested in 
the models that include it. Models 4 and 5 do exactly that. In model 4, the coefﬁ  cient of actual income inequality 
is estimated while controlling for general wealth. Income inequality is not signiﬁ  cant anymore. It seems that in 
Western countries, once we control for general wealth, income inequality is associated with general trust. Page • 27
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Model 5 estimates the effect of perceived income inequality, while controlling for general wealth. In this 
model, perceived income inequality is not statistically signiﬁ  cant, indicating that, once we take general wealth into 
account, the aggregate level of perceived inequality in a country is not associated with the likelihood of general 
trust. Model 6 includes all macro-level variables simultaneously. Neither actual nor perceived inequality is signiﬁ  -
cant, while general wealth is. These ﬁ  ndings indicate that, using data from the ISSP, once we control for general 
wealth, both types of inequality do not seem to matter much for trust in Western countries. 
Table 4 shows the estimates for similar models using data form the European Social Survey. In model 1, there 
is no signiﬁ  cant effect of income inequality on social trust. Once again, our primary interest lies in a model in 
which control for general wealth (model 2). In model 2, income inequality is neither statistically signiﬁ  cant. We 
do, however, observe a signiﬁ  cant positive effect of general wealth, indicating that people in richer countries have 
higher levels of trust. One might argue that the absence of the inequality effects is due to the ordinal nature of the 
variable, as the standard measure of trust is often measured as a dichotomous variable. Analyses on dichotomous 
versions (with different thresholds of trusting) of the dependent variable, however, mimic the results in table 4. 
To summarize, the models using ESS data are in line with the ﬁ  ndings based on the ISSP: in Western industri-
alized countries, once we control for general wealth actual income inequality does not seem to be associated with 
the likelihood, or the level of trusting.  
One reason that we do not ﬁ  nd support for the inequality-trust hypothesis in both our samples might be that 
there are inﬂ  uential outliers. That is, although we analysed a sample of relatively homogenous western industri-
alized countries, there could be inﬂ  uential cases that bias the relation between inequality and trust. To check for 
potential inﬂ  uential cases, we followed the procedure as suggested by Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer 
(2010). We calculated the DFBETAS and compare them with the threshold value of  x n / 2 . In the ISSP and 
ESS we ﬁ  nd a few inﬂ  uential cases. However, excluding them from the sample, either individually or pair wise, 
does not affect the direction or signiﬁ  cance of the relevant independent variables Our conclusions are therefore not 
dependent on inﬂ  uential cases.Page • 28
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5.  Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that there are three pitfalls to the argument that income inequality decreases so-
cial trust. First, the literature often does not distinguish between effects of the distribution of resources (inequality 
effects) and effects of the availability of resources (wealth effects), while these are theoretically and empirically 
different. Second, we argued that the mechanism is often unclear. We introduced a distinction between two mecha-
nisms as to how inequality might affect trust: through effects of stratiﬁ  cation and through effects of perceived 
inequality.  Last, the effect of inequality that is found in previous studies might be dependent on the case selection. 
The inequality-trust hypothesis might only hold for very high levels of income inequality. 
  To test our argument empirically, we estimated two series of models predicting general trust in Western 
industrialized countries. Using data from the ISSP, we introduced a measurement of perceived inequality. This data 
consists of individual estimates of stereotypical job earnings. A comparison of the resulting perceived inequality 
index with the widely applied Gini-coefﬁ  cient for actual income inequality in 20 countries indicated that both in-
dices measure substantively different concepts. Bivariate analyses replicate previous ﬁ  ndings in research on social 
trust. With regards to both actual and perceived income inequality, we initially found support for the theoretical 
claims. Both types of inequalities are negatively associated with individual likelihood to trust others. Furthermore, 
countries that are richer are more trusting.
We have argued, however, that in order to rule out rival explanations one needs to simultaneously test these ar-
guments. Although we ﬁ  nd substantive between country-variation in the likelihood of trusting, once we control for 
national wealth, both actual and perceived inequality do not seem to explain trust. An additional analysis, taking 
an even more homogenous sample of European countries  (using data from the European Social Survey), yielded 
the same results: while there is substantive country-variation in levels of trust, once we control for national wealth, 
actual income inequality does not explain this variation. 
 The  presented  ﬁ  ndings challenge the often-made claim that there is a negative linear effect of income 
inequality on general trust. When we examine Western industrialized countries, neither an explanation that distin-
guishes between types of inequality effects, nor an explanation that lumps all inequality effects together seems to 
be able to explain individual levels of trust This suggests that in Western industrialized countries arguments based 
on national wealth are more apt to explain variation in general trust. We found a signiﬁ  cant positive association 
between national wealth and the likelihood to trust people, with and without controlling for both types of income 
inequality. It seems therefore that studies on trust in Western countries might do well to focus more on national Page • 30
Sander Steijn and Bram Lancee
wealth, rather than on income inequality as an important explanation for trust. People in richer countries experi-
ence less (economic) risks and therefore trust other people more than people in poorer countries.
  One should, however, be cautious in concluding that income inequality does not matter at all for general 
trust. It is important to stress that in this study, we speciﬁ  cally looked at Western industrialized countries, with rela-
tively low levels of income inequality. Our results do not rule out the possibility that, after surpassing a threshold, 
inequality becomes a signiﬁ  cant predictor of social trust. Furthermore, in countries with different cultural charac-
teristics, income inequality might be of different importance. There are some other limitations to this study. For 
example, we relied on an aggregated measure of inequality perception, where an individual-level measure could 
have provided additional information. Furthermore, in this study we have only examined cross-national data. As 
such, we cannot  rule out potential reverse causality. In order to fully reject the argument about inequalities detri-
mental effects on social trust (both trough stratiﬁ  cation as well as perception effects) we would need longitudinal 
data on both the dependent variable (generalized trust) and the three independent variables (perceived and actual 
income inequality and national wealth). 
  Future research on income inequality and trust would beneﬁ  t from further developing the theoretical ar-
guments that constitute the mechanism between inequality and trust. At this point, for research on trust in Western 
industrialized countries, it might be more fruitful to further develop theory about national wealth, and more speciﬁ  -
cally develop hypotheses about  the presence of economic risks in society. Such hypotheses cannot only be tested 
easier, but (more importantly) might be more apt in explaining trust.  Page • 31
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